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Abstract
Evidence from ten natural field studies comparing long-distance
runners’ incentivized predictions of race finishing time with their ac-
tual finishing time is reported. A modest but regular bias is found.
Male runners are consistently found to be more time optimistic than
female runners and finish slower than they predict to finish. Males
are found to over-appreciate their physical fitness. To the extent this
behaviour carries over to other contexts, such as the labor market, the
tendency of men to overestimate their capacity could lead to distorted
self-appraisals and give them advantages in terms of higher salaries
and better positions.
JEL classification: C93, D01, D03
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1 Introduction
How long will it take? This is a very common question. It could be parents
trying to schedule their children’s weekly activities or a couple scheduling
a lunch date. At work it could be a project manager trying to estimate
the time it will take to complete a project. The project could be small-
scale and private or large-scale and public. One example of the latter is the
construction of Berlin Brandenburg Airport which began in 2006 after 15
years of planning. The airport was originally planned to open in 2010 but
ran several delays and still has not been finished. Or suppose a manager
deciding whom to recruit of the two candidates Anna and Bob. Bob is more
confident about his productivity than Anna and claims to have a lower task
completion time. Assuming that the candidates are honest, can we believe
in their self-appraisal? More generally, can people be trusted to accurately
predict their task completion times? Or are people likely to give optimistic
predictions? And if so, do men provide more optimistic predictions than
females? These are the questions that are addressed in this study.
The phenomenon we explore is known as overconfidence. The study
of overconfidence originated in psychology and the trait expresses more
strongly in relation to difficult tasks, tasks with low predictability, and
for tasks that lack fast and clear feedback (Fischhoff et al., 1977; Griffin
and Tversky, 1992). Many studies on the topic are based on survey data
where overconfidence is measured by asking respondents to rank themselves
compared with others. A common finding is that a majority of people over-
estimate their skills compared to the median individual for tasks such as
driving a car which is known as overplacement and is an expression of over-
confidence (e.g. Svenson, 1981). Another stream of studies uses objective
measures to reach their conclusion. For example, Buehler et al. (1994) found
that students expect to finish a task faster than their objectively measured
completion time, which is known as overoptimism. Yet another stream of lit-
erature looks at whether people overestimate the precision of their knowledge
(Fischhoff et al., 1977). Hence, the term overconfidence has a broad mean-
ing referring to overplacement, overoptimism (e.g. time optimism) as well as
overprecision. Overoptimism can either apply to own completion time, oth-
ers’ completion times or both. The focus in this study is on overoptimism
regarding own completion time which we also refer to as time optimism,
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meaning that people overestimate their productivity. Time optimism is an
issue that have not gained much attention by economists.1 Biases in be-
liefs are, however, central to the understanding of behavior which in turn
can have wider economic implications. For example, using a a mechanism
design approach Palomino and Peyrache (2010) show that a gender gap in
wages can emerge because of differences in self-confidence even if men and
women are equally productive since overconfidence makes men to give more
effort. Another reason for the gender gap in wages could be that women
negotiate less frequently than men and when they do negotiate they ask for
less money (Babcock and Laschever, 2009).
The interest of economist in understanding overconfidence was recently
captured by a symposium in Journal of Economic Perspectives (Malmendier
and Taylor, 2015).2 An important issue in economics is whether biases that
are found in individual decision-making are persistent or if they tend to van-
ish with increasing experience. The model of Gervais and Odean (2001) pre-
dicts that overconfidence decreases with financial-market experience and is
corroborated by the experimental evidence of Menkhoff et al. (2013). While
one could expect the overconfidence among rational Bayesian decision mak-
ers to disappear with sufficient experience (e.g. Van den Steen, 2004) there
are also circumstances to the contrary where overconfidence in estimation
precision increases with experience (Van den Steen, 2011). Buehler et al.
(1994) found that decision-makers do not even consider past history when
assessing their abilities. Hence, while overconfidence is claimed to be a ro-
bust finding the question of its existence among experienced people is not
fully settled. As we will come back to, the data used in the present study
provides a rare opportunity to learn about the behaviour of people with
extraordinary access to immediate, precise, and objective feedback on their
abilities. To find situations where people have access to better feedback in
a natural context is, if not impossible, at least very hard.
The economic literature has shown that investors in general and males in
particular tend to trade more than what is rationally granted, which in turn
1In psychology the phenomena have gained much more attention and relates to the
literature about the planning fallacy.
2Grubb (2015) address how consumer overconfidence alters market outcomes. Daniel
and Hirshleifer (2015) discuss the importance of understanding overconfidence in relation
to financial decision-making and financial markets. Malmendier and Tate (2015) provides
a framework to structure the literature on overconfidence of CEOs.
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has been interpreted as a gender difference in overconfidence (e.g. Barber
and Odean, 2001). Notably, however, the evidence found in the economic
literature on overconfidence is not always based on economic decisions. For
example, Bengtsson et al. (2005) found that males, especially young males,
are more overconfident than females about their exam results, and Nekby
et al. (2008) found evidence on overconfidence using data from a large 10
km running race in Sweden. Using a laboratory experiment where the par-
ticipants solved math problems, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that
overconfidence is a key factor in explaining gender differences in willingness
to compete. One reason that researchers take interest in evidence beyond
economic markets is that overconfidence is considered a psychological trait
that is relatively robust across situations (Borghans et al., 2008).3 This
does not mean that context is negligible in understanding overconfidence,
e.g., Beyer and Bowden (1997) found significant gender differences in over-
confidence in tasks that can traditionally be considered as male dominant
such as knowledge in football, baseball, and basketball, but not in tasks
considered to be traditionally female or gender-neutral.
The main aim of the present paper is to investigate time optimism and
gender differences in time optimism. This is accomplished by comparing
actual and predicted race times among Swedish long-distance runners. Swe-
den is known to do fairly well in gender equality compared with many other
countries (Bekhouche et al., 2013), which makes it an interesting country for
a study on gender differences. Participating in a long-distance race means
months of extensive training.4 Long-distance runners commonly measure
the time, distance, and speed of their workouts to get feedback on their
physical capacity which in turn helps them optimize their race pacing.5
Weekly running distances for non-elite male marathon runners is estimated
to 30-60 km while 25 percent run more than 60 km. Moreover, most non-
elite runners who participate in a competition are not competing for the first
time (Ho¨lmich et al., 1989). Will the runners provide unbiased prediction
3Using a classic twin design Cesarini et al. (2009) estimate the genetic and environmen-
tal contributions to individual differences in overconfidence. The reported point estimates
show that genes accounted for roughly three times the percentage of the variance in the
overconfidence scores as compared to environment.
4While shorter races could attract a few participants without training experience, this
would be very unlikely in long-distance (21.1, 30 and 42.2 km) races we use in this study.
5Optimal pacing means to run the race at a speed that minimizes the race finishing
time.
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or will they predict that they will run faster than they actually end up do-
ing? Do males typically give more time optimistic predictions than females?
These are the questions we wish to address. To this end a unique data set
is used that is collected in the participants natural environment, consisting
of experienced participants with extraordinary access to immediate, precise,
and objective feedback on their abilities. Notably, the participants of this
study are not claimed to be representative to the general population. To
the contrary, they have access to extraordinary feedback and it is by observ-
ing behaviour in these extreme circumstances that offers an opportunity to
learn whether the bias is sufficiently persistent. If runners are found overly
optimistic about their abilities one can reasonable expect that people that
do not have access to extraordinary feedback to be even more biased.
The most related papers to presented paper are Nekby et al. (2008) and
Krawczyk and Wilamowski (2016). Nekby et al. (2008) use data from a large
10 km running race in Sweden to test for gender differences in self-selecting
to start groups based predicted race times. Women were found more likely
to self-select to faster starting groups than warranted by their performance
compared to males. As discussed by the authors, whether this behavior can
be explained by overconfidence or over-competitiveness cannot be concluded
from their data. Strategic advantages of being in an early start group could
potentially affects their results. Krawczyk and Wilamowski (2016) utilized
data on 345 participants (20 percent women) of Warsaw Marathon to study
overconfidence and found men to be more overconfident. In an extension
they use mid-point split-time as an indirect proxy measure for overconfidence
to test for determinants of overconfidence.
There are several advantages of the research presented in this paper com-
pared with other studies. First of all, we make use of a unique data set. The
data is collected in the participants natural environment and the participants
have extraordinary access to feedback on their abilities. This allows us to
assess test the persistence of overconfidence. Moreover, the data is collected
as part of a marketing campaign without any ambitions to use the data for
scientific purposes. This could potentially help to reduce the problem of
demand artifacts (Zizzo, 2010). Second, instead of relying on only one run-
ning race we use data from ten samples consisting of near 5000 observations.
The samples consist of data from races arranged in different years and with
different subject pools. This allows us to assess the robustness of our results.
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Third, a direct measure of overconfidence is used to capture gender differ-
ences and hence we do not confound our analysis with proxy variables. Using
proxy variables would make it potentially harder to distinguish whether any
gender differences are caused by physiological or behavioral differences.6 Fi-
nally, the the runners’ predictions were incentivized.7 While most of the
experimental studies of overconfidence in psychology do not provide mone-
tary incentives for truthful responses, Cesarini et al. (2006) found that the
level of measured overconfidence was largely reduced when using monetary
incentives in several confidence interval tasks.
The main result of this study is that men are found more time optimistic
compared to women. A positive gender difference is found in all samples
and is significant in most of the samples. Moreover, a pooled analysis that
includes the influence of weather confirms the existence of time optimism as
a general phenomena among runners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
the conceptual framework is introduced. After detailing the field studies
(Section 3), we present the empirical findings (Section 4). We summarize
the main points of our study and offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Conceptual Framework and Identification
Two types of information are important for successful predictions, singular
and distributional information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1977). Singular
information consists of distinguishing knowledge about the particular case
under consideration. For runners, singular information may include an as-
6Deaner et al. (2015) study gender differences in pacing using data from 14 marathons
in the U.S. While male runners are found to be more likely to slow down in pace compared
to female runners, several reasons are mentioned for this behaviour. It could reflect phys-
iological differences, such as men’s greater susceptibility to muscle glycogen depletion, or
women’s skeletal muscle which is shown to suffer from lesser fatigability. The gender dif-
ference in pacing may also reflect differences in decision making. As discussed by Hayner
and Mercer (2011) many marathon runners simply want to complete the event and for
them an increased variability of pace would be optimal. Others might be willing to take
a risk of running too fast in the beginning in an attempt to break some personal record.
For these reasons using split time as a proxy for overconfidence could be problematic.
7Incentivizing could also make things worse as runners could slow down to finish on
the predicted time. We do not believe this to be a problem in practice. As suggested by
Allen et al. (2016) ”for the overwhelming majority of runners, race times are a source of
internal pride and fulfillment and not an extrinsic reward.”
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sessment the particular race compares with other races.8 Distributional
information may include statistics of the distribution of outcomes in sim-
ilar situations. It could be based on previous experience of similar tasks,
e.g. times in comparable races and training sessions. Runners collect dis-
tributional information primarily during their training using either a simple
stopwatch that only measures time or using more advanced gadget that
measures both time and distance.
What could lead to unsuccessful predictions and time optimism? Sup-
pose a marathon-runner who completed 18 training sessions in the month
leading up to the race. Fourteen of these were ran under ideal conditions,
i.e., with perfect weather and after eating the right food and getting good
sleep. The remaining four were run under non-ideal conditions e.g., bad
weather or an aching knee, yielding slower running times. A runner could
ignore the undesirable outcomes and only consider the faster running times
as representative of his or her capacity. Hence, runners may truncate the
right tail of the distribution of running time and hence reduce the expected
race time. According to Taylor and Brown (1988) people exaggerate their
own abilities because it improves their mental health. This is of course
only one possible reason why some runners are overoptimistic about their
race times. Using a think-aloud protocol Buehler et al. (1994) found that
decision-makers focused primarily on future scenarios when predicting their
completion times.
There is also increasing evidence of gender differences in competitiveness
in distance running (for a review see Deaner et al., 2015). Although most
non-elite runners run for affiliation, health and life-meaning, important gen-
der differences have been noted. While male runners are more goal-oriented
and motivated by competition, female runners are motivated more by the
affiliation running offers them, and to use running as strategy to cope with
stress and control their body weight (Deaner et al., 2015). This could make
males more likely to suppress distributional data that conflicts with their
desired race time, which in turn can potentially result in a gender difference
in time optimism. Moreover, males could have some biological advantages in
running (Cheuvront et al., 2005). Therefore, to be as good as male runners,
female runners could need to compensate with increased training. More
8Details of the race course and elevation is usually available on the web-page of the
race.
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training means more feedback on performance capacity which in turn can
make female runners less time optimistic. We will now turn to the question
of how time optimism is identified in our study.
A systematic deviation between the predicted and actual running time
is identify as bias and distinguished from a random error. Hence, to some-
times be better and sometimes worse than predicted is not to be biased. To
systematically perform worse than predicted is, however, to be biased.9 To
give some examples, suppose that there is a group of runners where each
runner either finish in 240 or 250 minutes with equal probability and that
they have knowledge about this particular distribution. If half of the run-
ners would predict 240 and 250 minutes respectively, their predictions would
be unbiased as a group. On the contrary, if more than half of the runners
would predict a race time of 240 or 250 minutes they would be biased. Also
note that if all of the runners believe that they will finish in 245 minutes
their beliefs would be distorted but their predictions unbiased. Hence, if
predictions are biased, beliefs are distorted but distorted beliefs does not
necessary imply that predictions are biased. Alternatively, suppose that 95
percent of the runner finish in 240 minutes and 5 percent finish in 300 min-
utes. If everyone believes that they will finish in 240 minutes they clearly
have disordered beliefs. It is even possible that each runner knows the prob-
abilities but prefers to be exactly correct 95 percent of the time compared to
being correct on average, and therefore predict a race time of 240 minutes.
Notably the average race time is 243 minutes. Beliefs are distorted, since
despite knowing the true distribution none of the runners believe that they
will belong to the 5 percent with a slower race time. This form of optimistic
bias concerning personal risk is well-known (Weinstein, 1989).
The following two research hypotheses will be tested: 1)Do people typ-
ically predict that they will run faster than they actually end up doing. 2)
Do males typically make more time optimistic predictions than females?
While our sample consists of experienced participants, we do expect
within-sample heterogeneity in experience. More specifically, more experi-
enced people are expected to be less biased. Training increases experience,
which in turn improves both performance and knowledge about physical lim-
9More specifically, suppose the time bias is symmetrically distributed with a mean of
zero. Given this outcome we will not conclude half of the participants to be overconfi-
dent(and the other half to be under-confident). Instead we simply conclude that the null
hypothesis of no bias cannot be rejected.
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its. Therefore people that are faster are expected to be less overconfident
and a positive relationship between bias and race time is expected.10 11
3 The Field Studies
The data examing runners’ predictions of their race time was collected by
SJ, a government-owned passenger train operator in Sweden, as part of a
marketing campaign, and JOGG 12, a Swedish online community for runners.
Participants could take part in the prediction challenge either on the web-
page of SJ or JOGG, or at runners’ expeditions, starting two days before
the respective races. Notably, at the time the campaigns were on there was
no ambition to make use of the data for scientific purposes. The runners’
predictions were subsequently matched with actual race time data that is
available on the web page of the races.
Here is an example of a slogan used by Swedish national train company
SJ to attract runners to predict their race time:
Predict your race time: At SJ we know how important it is to run on
time. Now we challenge you to predict your race time. The runners with
the best predictions will have a chance to win a free trip with us.
JOGG, the online community for runners, used a text like the following:
Dear Runners, go to the race page and guess your time. The winners
are those that guess closest to the actual race time. At stake are several very
good travelers’ checks from SJ and Apollo Travel. Here we go! 13
JOGG’s campaign could be one way to strengthen members ties and
keep members active and engaged in the online community.
The runners’ predictions were encouraged with material incentives such
as chance to win train tickets. As already mentioned, Cesarini et al. (2006)
10Tanda (2011) found that mean distance per week and the mean training pace were
strongly correlated with marathon race time.
11Unexpected shocks like an injury could result in a slower race time and a positive
bias in predictions. However, as long as the unexpected shocks are randomly distributed
among all runners, prediction bias and race time will be uncorrelated.
12JOGG collected data in collaboration with SJ.
13Apollo is one of Scandinavia’s largest travel organisation companies.
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found that the level of measured overconfidence was largely reduced when
using monetary incentives in several confidence interval tasks. Material
incentives give people incentives to stick to the truth and can also make
them exert more cognitive effort to make more accurate predictions. This
is of course important as it directly relates to the hypothesis of the present
study. As already mentioned, too high incentives could potentially make
things even worse as runners could slow down to finish on the predicted
time which implies that we if anything would underestimate time optimism.
This is, however, not deemed to be a problem in practice as race times are
a source of internal pride and fulfillment and not an extrinsic reward (Allen
et al., 2016).
All in all we have data from ten field studies. These are gathered from
four races (Go¨teborgsvarvet Half Marathon, Lidingo¨loppet, Stockholm Half
Marathon and Stockholm Marathon) using two different sampling frames
(SJ and JOGG) and two different years (2015 and 2016). All of these races
are held annually. The field studies are summarized in Table 1.
Gothenburg Half Marathon, i.e., Go¨teborgsvarvet has been recognized
as the world’s largest half marathon. The first race was held in June 7, 1980,
and it usually takes place in early May every year. Stockholm Half Marathon
is in early September and has been arranged since 2001. Lidingo¨loppet is a
30 km cross-country race held in Lidingo¨, Sweden in late September. The
race attracts 15,000 participants per year and is one of the largest cross-
country events in the world. It is held the last weekend of September each
year. Stockholm Marathon has been arranged since 1979 and serves as the
Swedish marathon championship race. It is usually held in late May or early
June.
More male than female runners participate in the races. For the half-
marathons the share of males is typically 60 - 65 percent, while the share
of males in the longer races is about 70 - 75 percent. The mean age of the
participants is about 40 years. As we will come back to when discussing the
results, only a small share of all runners predicted their race time. Those
that participated were in general faster than those that did not participate
and therefore potential selection effects will be handled in the regression
analysis.
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Table 1: Summary of the field studies
Field Study Race Sampling Frame Year Distance (km) Population size Sample size
1 Gothenburg Half Marathon JOGG 2015 21.1 46287 1463
2 Gothenburg Half Marathon SJ 2015 21.1 46287 330
3 Gothenburg Half Marathon SJ 2016 21.1 44995 531
4 Stockholm Half Marathon SJ 2015 21.1 12232 71
5 Stockholm Half Marathon SJ 2016 21.1 10622 171
6 Lidingo¨loppet JOGG 2015 30 17482 180
7 Lidingo¨loppet SJ 2015 30 17482 1036
8 Lidingo¨loppet SJ 2016 30 15432 308
9 Stockholm Marathon SJ 2015 42.2 17482 474
10 Stockholm Marathon SJ 2016 42.2 12854 304
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4 Results
We will discuss the results first for the Gothenburg and Stockholm Half
Marathon (21.1 km race), then for Lidingo¨loppet (30 km race) and finally
for the Stockholm Marathon (42.2 km race). Since the subjects were asked
to enter their predictions into a computer without technical assistance the
presence of incorrectly entered data cannot be excluded. To reduce the in-
fluence of incorrectly entered data the following measures were taken. For
the Half-Marathon (21 km) we do not include subjects who expected a race
time in excess of 300 minutes. Note that it takes less than 300 minutes
to walk this distance at a comfortable speed (5 km/hour) hence these par-
ticipants do not in any case belong to the targeted population of runners.
Similarly, for the 30 km race and the full marathon, the thresholds were set
to 400 minutes and 480 minutes, respectively. In total 26 observations were
excluded of 4873 (0.5 percent).14
In figure 1 we graphically summarize the numerical data through their
quartiles using box-plots of the different samples. Initially we want to get
a general impression of the accuracy of the predictions and therefore we do
not divide the sample between male and females. Bias is measured as the
difference between actual and predicted race time. Hence, a positive value
indicates time optimism and a negative value the opposite. Starting with the
half marathons (Panel A) we see that the runners predictions are relatively
well-calibrated and that the median bias indicated by the horizontal line
inside the boxes do not exceed 5 minutes for any of the samples. For most
of the samples the bias is even smaller. The box (which contains 50 % of
the observations) is often located relatively more on the positive part of
the Y-axis which reveals a tendency of the subjects to be time optimistic.
Nevertheless, a non-negligible fraction of the runners underestimate their
race time. If we look at the 30 km races (Panel B) we observe that the
boxes are now more on the positive axis. Finally, in Panel C we see that
the typical runners of the full marathon are also relatively well-calibrated,
however, the quality of the predictions is more scattered than for the shorter
14Three of 2566 observations were excluded in the half marathon samples, one obser-
vation each for three of the samples, while all observations were kept in the remaining 2
samples. For three 30 km samples, 12 of 1524 observations were excluded. Turning to
the full marathon race, 11 observations were deleted from the year 2015 sample, while no
observations were excluded from the 2016 sample.
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races. Throughout most of the samples we observe that the larger part of
the box is above the median, meaning that the data is skewed right, and
this is particularly true for the full marathon race. Across all the samples
we find the runners’ beliefs and predictions to be fairly accurate. Extreme
values located beyond the whiskers of the box-plots are not shown yet are
present in all of the samples. For this reason we will focus on the median
instead of the mean when assessing judgment errors. The median is more
robust to extreme values and is the preferred measure or central tendency for
skewed distributions. Also note that we do not distinguish between males
and females when constructing the box-plots. To gain a first impression of
gender differences we turn to the descriptive statistics.
12
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Figure 1: Field-study 1 (top left panel) to 10 (bottom right panel)
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Descriptive statistics for the samples are presented in Appendix A, B and
C.15 For males the median bias is positive for all ten samples. For female
runners the median bias is negative for two of the samples (field-studies 4
and 9) and positive for the remaining samples. The general impression based
on these samples is that runners typically underestimate their race time and
that they suffer from time optimism.16 The point-estimate for the bias is
greater for the 30 km and 42.2 km races, than for the 21.1 km races.
Turning to gender differences, the median bias is greater for males than
for females in all but one of the samples (field-study 2).17 We will not,
however, conclude based on tests that compares the medians of two pop-
ulations but instead turn to regression analysis. Using regression analysis
allows to compare gender differences for equally fast runners and to control
for observable selection effects. Notably, although we have a considerable
number of observations in our samples only a small share of all runners
made a prediction about their race time. Moreover, the average race times
are in generally lower for runners who participate in the prediction contest
compared to the population of runners (see Appendix A, B and C) which
makes it important to control for these selection effects.
Another interesting result is that comparing the shares of males and
females who ran slower than predicted, the share of males who are time
optimistic ranges from 53 to 82 percent with a average of 66 percent. For
women, the share ranges from 38 to 78 percent with a average of 55 percent.
Hence, the tendency to be time optimistic is again found to be stronger
among males.18
15Appendix A present descriptive statistics for the half-marathon races, Appendix B
for the 30 km races, and Appendix C for the full marathon races.
16The median bias is statistically significant for seven of the samples for male runners
(the samples with non-significant median values are field-studies 2, 4 and 9) and two of
the samples for female runners (field-studies 3 and 5) at a 5 percent significance level.
17The difference is statistically significant for three of the populations using the
Wilcoxon two-sided rank-sum test at the 5 percent significance level and additional three
at the more generous 10 percent significance level. The field-studies with the significant
differences are field-studies 1, 7, 8 at 5 percent significance level and 4, 6, and 10 at a 10
percent significance level.
18The share of males and females that ran slower than predicted were: Field-study 1:
58 % males, 51% females. Field-study 2: 56 % males, 52% females. Field-study 3: 63
% males, 58% females. Field-study 4: 65 % males, 38% females. Field-study 5: 82 %
males, 78% females. Field-study 6: 77 % males, 58% females. Field-study 7: 68 % males,
51% females. Field-study 8: 67 % males, 57% females. Field-study 9: 53 % males, 48%
females. Field-study 10: 68 % males, 58% females
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4.1 Regression Results
For simplicity the same model specification is used for all samples (see equa-
tion 1).19 OLS and Quantile regression models were estimated for each of
the samples separately. Since the observations between the samples cannot
be assumed to be independent and individuals that are included in several
samples cannot be identified the samples are initially not pooled. Once the
main results are established a pooled analysis is presented to explore how
time optimism is effected by weather together with some additional control
variables. One needs to be cautious, however, when interpreting the pooled
analysis since the observations are not necessarily independent which in turn
can effect the standard errors.
Bias = α+ β1 ·Male+ β2 ·Race time+  (1)
The dependent variable is the difference between actual and expected
race time. The main parameter of interest is β1 which captures gender
differences. The second variable in equation (1) is a control variable that fa-
cilitates a comparison of time optimism bias between male and females with
the same race time. As already mentioned, it also captures a within-sample
heterogeneity in experience and a positive β2 means that faster runners are
less time optimistic.
While both ordinary least square (OLS) and quantile regressions are
presented the focus is on the quantile regressions. The quantile regressions
are more robust to outliers and therefore better reflects typical bias in the
population. OLS regressions are still included for comparison. While OLS
estimates the mean of the dependent variable conditional on the covariates,
the quantile regression estimates the effect of the covariates on different
quantiles of the distribution of the dependent variable that captures the
19An interaction term between the gender dummy and race time was included in addi-
tion to the main effects in an initial analysis. Because of biological differences one could
expect that females have to train more to run as fast as males. More training in turn
makes them more experienced. Therefore, an improved finishing time could be expected
to effect time optimism for females more than males which in turn justifies inclusions of
interaction terms. None of the samples did support this conjecture, however, and on the
contrary, we find that that a change in finishing time effects males more than females in
two of the samples (field studies 6 and 7). Therefore we proceed without including the
interaction terms that was insignificant in most of the samples.
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bias. This gives us a more detailed understanding of gender differences of
time optimism. The 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 quantile regressions are presented
but the main focus is on the 0.50 quantile which is also known as the median
regression function. The location of these quantiles are shown in the box
plots where we see that for most of the samples the 0.25 quantile is negative
while the 0.50 and 0.75 quantile is positive. Robust standard errors that are
asymptotically valid under heteroskedasticity are used for the OLS (White,
1980) and for the quantile regressions (Machado et al., 2015).
4.1.1 Half-marathon
The results of the median regressions for the 21.1 km races are presented
in Table 2 for the first three field-studies and in Table 3 for the remaining
two field-studies. Gender differences are found in all samples at a 5 percent
significance level except in field study 2. The positive values for β1 across
all samples mean that males are more confident than females with the same
race time. The average of β1 across the five samples is about 2.4 minutes
meaning that male runners prediction error is 2.4 minutes larger than that
of female runners. Also note that the time optimism significantly increases
with race time (β2 > 0) and the point estimates range from 0.08 to 0.21.
Finally, if we focus on people with stronger bias (i.e. on the 0.75 quantile)
we see statistically significant gender differences for all of the samples at the
5 percent significance level. The magnitude of the coefficient is greater at
the 0.75 quantile for all samples except field study 4. For the 0.25 quantile
the opposite pattern with lower β1 coefficient is observed and statistically
significance is only found in two of the samples at a 1 percent significance
level. Hence, we find stronger gender differences if we compare people who
are more time optimistic instead of people who are less time optimistic.
In a next step we use equation (1) to calculate the median time bias
adjusted for selection effects for males. Table 4 summarizes the results,
time biases for both male and female runners are evaluated at the population
median finishing time for male runners. First of all we note that the bias
is positive for all of the samples for males which is indicative that they in
particular are time optimistic while the results for female runners are more
mixed. Taking an examples, for Field study 1 the bias for male runners
is estimated to be 1.65 minutes. The bias for females runners with the
same finishing time is −0.25 minutes (-15 seconds). The gender difference
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Table 2: Regression results for the Gothenburg half-marathons (21.1 km)
Median Quantile 0.25 Quantile 0.75 OLS
Field Study 1
Intercept -10.8680*** -5.9397*** -20.3252*** -22.1292***
(1.3506) (1.4356) (1.8464) (3.3695)
Male 1.9*** 1.3586*** 3.5658*** 3.7865***
(0.3337) (0.3834) (0.4641) (0.5679)
Race time 0.0923*** 0.0264* 0.1960*** 0.1781***
(0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0156) (0.0280)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.13
Number of obs. 1463 1463 1463 1463
Field Study 2
Intercept -9.3140*** -6.6661* -15.09691*** -7.7823
(3.1760) (3.0058) (2.6964) (4.7252)
Male 0.6913 1.3459 1.9506** 0.1854
(0.8301) (1.2001) (0.7731) (1.1156)
Race time 0.082*** 0.0279 0.1481*** 0.0655*
(0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0231) (0.0370)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.03
Number of obs. 330 330 330 330
Field Study 3
Intercept -14.0496*** -7.2308*** -23.19871*** -20.5841***
(3.1595) (2.4036) (2.3559) (3.3151)
Male 2.3675*** 1.9862*** 3.2973*** 2.8241***
(0.7978) (0.6798) (0.8508) (0.8259)
Race time 0.1221*** 0.0389** 0.2305*** 0.1770***
(0.0261) (0.0206) (0.0183) (0.0267)
R2 0.07 0.01 0.21 0.17
Number of obs. 531 531 531 531
1 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for a two-sided
test.
Table 3: Regression results for the Stockholm half-marathons (21.1 km)
Median Quantile 0.25 Quantile 0.75 OLS
Field Study 4
Intercept -17.1075*** -14.0688 -16.5107*** -38.4238*
(5.4153) (8.8099) (4.4250) (20.4163)
Male 3.1376** 3.5114 4.7679** 0.0352
( 1.5097) (1.1512) (2.0518) (3.2902)
Race time 0.1338*** 0.0928 0.1560*** 0.3165*
(0.0457) (0.0775) (0.0349) (0.1657)
R2 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07
Number of obs. 71 71 71 71
Field Study 5
Intercept -21.1230*** -19.8553*** -23.3965*** -21.26471***
(3.7408) (5.6648) (4.7639) ( 5.1138)
Male 4.1493*** 2.3369 3.6130*** 2.3427*
(1.1567) (1.6335) (1.2361) (1.3691)
Race time 0.2100*** 0.1710*** 0.2604*** 0.2139***
(0.0312) (0.0428) (0.0410) (0.0391)
R2 0.17 0.08 0.23 0.24
Number of obs. 171 171 171 171
1 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for a two-sided
test.
2 The β1 coefficient for OLS in Field study 4 raises to 2.91 and is significant if one
extremely under-confident respondent is removed that ran about 170 minutes faster
than predicted.
Table 4: Time Bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
1 1.65 [1.21; 2.08] -0.25 [-0.70; 0.20]
2 0.64 [-0.20; 1.48] -0.05 [-1.24; 1.13]
3 2.40 [1.38; 3.41] 0.03 [-0.97; 1.02]
4 0.68 [-1.51; 2.88] -2.45 [-4.59; -0.31]
5 7.56[6.10; 9.02] 3.41 [1.68; 5.14]
corresponds to 1.9 minutes. The 95 percent confidence intervals in Table 4
show that males are found overconfident in three out of five samples, and
females are found under-confident in one and overconfident in one of the
five samples. Using equation (1) we can also calculate the median time bias
adjusted for selection effects for females. These results are given in Table
D1 in Appendix. Notably, we see that if both male and female runners are
evaluated at the population median finishing time for female runners the
point estimate of time bias is higher. This is a reoccurring pattern for all
of the races presented in this study. In summary, we observe a systematic
difference between male and female runners in their predictions of their own
race times, where males tend to be more time optimistic.
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4.1.2 Lidingo¨loppet
Table 5 summarizes the regression results for the 30 km races. The β1
coefficient for the median regressions that capture gender differences in time
optimism range from 4.2 to 7.5 minutes with an average of 5.35 minutes.
Hence, compared with the half-marathons the β1 coefficients are generally
larger. The coefficient is statistically significant for all populations at the 1
percent significance level except field study 6 which contains substantially
fewer observations. Focusing on the 0.75 quantile we observe same pattern
as observed earlier with higher point estimates of the β1 coefficients. The
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level for
all populations. For the 0.25 quantile the opposite pattern, i.e., lower β1
coefficient is observed. The effect is statistically significant in one of the
populations at the 1 percent significance level and in one population at the
10 percent significance level.
Equation (1) is used to calculate the median bias for the 30 km races for
male runners adjusted for selection effects. Time biases for both male and
female runners are evaluated at the population median finishing time for
male runners. Table 6 shows that male runners are typically overconfident
while female runners are less biased. The median time biases adjusted for
selection effects for females are given in Table D2 in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Regression results for the Lidingo¨loppet (30 km) races
Median Quantile 0.25 Quantile 0.75 OLS
Field Study 6
Intercept -15.2802 -11.0831* -34.3646*** -38.6812***
( 9.77258) (5.6466) (10.6437) ( 13.3571)
Male 4.3796 5.7354 6.4853** 11.0444***
(2.895959) (3.5563) ( 2.8896) (3.4136)
Race time 0.0976* 0.0398* 0.2436*** 0.2129***
(0.0553) (0.0239) (0.0590) (0.0701)
R2 0.06 0.02 0.19 0.26
Number of obs. 180 180 180 180
Field Study 7
Intercept -24.4552*** -9.3432*** -33.5416*** -28.7306***
(2.9052) (3.4946) (3.2594) (3.4384)
Male 7.4943*** 6.2033*** 9.1821*** 9.4892***
(0.9565) (1.1876) (1.0559) (1.1553)
Race time 0.1312*** 0.0099 0.2115*** 0.1432***
(0.0150) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0175)
R2 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.13
Number of obs. 1036 1036 1036 1036
Field Study 8
Intercept -28.7506*** -7.6299 -37.2152*** -32.16133***
(6.7294) (6.3888) (3.5709) (5.1955)
Male 4.1905*** 3.5421* 7.4929*** 7.037***
(1.6184) (1.8818) (1.3616) (1.7847)
Race time 0.1752*** 0.0172 0.2450*** 0.1804***
(0.0376) (0.0358) (0.0192) (0.0285)
R2 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.17
Number of obs. 308 308 308 308
1 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for a two-sided test.
Table 6: Time bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
6 6.39 [3.03; 9.74] 2.00 [-2.98; 6.98]
7 6.28 [5.27; 7.29] -1.21 [-2.64; 0.21]
8 6.81 [4.56; 9.07] 2.62 [0.29; 4.95]
4.1.3 Marathon
Table 7 summarizes the results from the full marathons (42.2 kilometers).
The β1 coefficients range from 2.7 to 5.0 minutes for the median regressions
with an average of 3.85 minutes and are statistically significant at the 5
percent level for both of the samples. In line with previous results, the
β1 coefficient at the 0.75 quantile regressions are consistently higher. In
line with previous field studies, lower β1 coefficients are observed for the
0.25 quantile. The coefficient is only statistically significant in one of the
samples (field study 10) at the 10 percent significance level.
Equation 1 is used to estimate the bias for males evaluated at population
median race time for males. Table 8 summarizes the confidence intervals.
While males are again shown to suffer from time optimism the bias in female
runners’ predictions are more in line with their actual race time. Women’s
median time biases adjusted for selection effects are given in Table D3 in
Appendix.
4.1.4 Summary of the results
In summary, gender differences in time optimism are found in all except
two samples for the median regressions. Males are more time optimistic and
more likely to overestimate their capacity. Comparing gender differences
between runners with the same race time, the average optimism bias across
the five samples of half-marathon runners is about 2.4 minutes greater for
males than for females. For the 30 km races, it is about 5.35 minutes and for
the full marathons 3.86 minutes. We also find a within-sample heterogeneity
in all of our samples, faster runners being less time optimistic. Using the
regression models it possible to estimate how fast a runner has to be for
him or her not to be overconfident. Based on these calculations we find
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Table 7: Regression results for the Stockholm Marathons (42.2 km)
Regressions Median Quantile 0.25 Quantile 0.75 OLS
Field Study 9
Intercept -13.9132*** -1.6296 -26.1250*** -26.3259***
(4.1270) (7.1635) (5.4554) (5.9721)
Male 2.7272** 1.2971 4.3630** 3.6680**
(1.2117) (1.4971) (1.7330) (1.5698)
Race time 0.05625*** -0.0203 0.1331*** 0.1015***
(0.0175) (0.0314) (0.0224) (0.0238)
R2 0.02 0.002 0.08 0.04
Number of obs. 474 474 474 474
Field Study 10
Intercept -19.5027*** -5.6132 -39.67823*** -35.52923***
(7.4728) (5.6662) (7.3692) (7.7731)
Male 4.9810** 3.9168* 5.7447*** 5.826**
(2.1393) (2.0447) (2.2198) (2.4813)
Race time 0.0864*** -0.0033 0.2057*** 0.152***
(0.0313) (0.0227) (0.0316) (0.0313)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.10
Number of obs. 304 304 304 304
1 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for a two-sided test.
Table 8: Time bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
9 2.12 [0.73; 3.51] -0.61 [-2.58; 1.36]
10 6.18 [3.67; 8.69] 1.20 [-2.26; 4.66]
that the median runner is overconfident in all of the samples. For example,
for field study 10, males that run slower than 168 minutes are found to
be overconfident, while the median finishing time for males is about 240
minutes.20
The average time optimism bias for males is 2.59, 6.49 and 4.15 minutes
for the half marathons, 30 km races and full marathons respectively. For
the females it is 1.81, 3.78 and 2.01 minutes.21
4.2 Pooled Regression Results
In a final analysis we pool the ten samples and estimate regression models
for the pooled data. In addition to the two main variables, gender and race
time, temperature and wind is also included to control for the influence of
weather on time optimism. Furthermore, a dummy variable is included to
control for time specific effects, distance is controlled using a dummy for the
30 km (Distance30) and full-marathon race (Distance42.2) respectively. A
dummy variable SJ is included to distinguish whether data was collected
by SJ, government-owned passenger train operator in Sweden, or JOGG,
a Swedish online community for runners. Table 7 summarizes the results.
Most of the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Gender differ-
ences in time optimism is confirmed, males are more time optimistic. In line
with previous results, faster runners are less time optimistic. Considering
the effect of the weather, higher temperatures and wind speed is positively
correlated with time optimism. Moreover, members of the online running
community JOGG are more time optimistic. It could be that members of
JOGG are more competitive which in turn makes them more biased. These
results are all in line with what one could expect.22 In general the pooled
model is consistent with models presented in the previous sections but due
to the increased sample size the precision of the estimates have substantially
increased.
20(-19.5027+4.9810/-0.0864)=168
21These estimates are based on predictions from the median regression model using the
median race time for the male and female population respectively.
22Distance is important to control, however, the interpretation is less important since
one cannot reasonably expect the same finishing time for the half marathons, 30 km races
and full marathons respectively.
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Table 9: Pooled Regression Analysis
Median Quantile 0.25 Quantile 0.75 OLS
Intercept -17.8290*** -9.8561*** -25.2792*** -23.6058***
(1.2511) (1.3966) (1.1693) ( 1.9000)
Male 2.9632*** 2.5075*** 4.2061*** 4.7843***
(0.2632) (0.3135) (0.2992) (0.4127)
Race time 0.1079*** 0.0195** 0.1972*** 0.1482***
(0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0100)
Temperature 0.1977*** 0.1526*** 0.1594*** 0.1537***
(0.0375) (0.04651) (0.0397) (0.0561)
Wind 0.3353*** 0.3306*** 0.4617*** 0.4599***
(0.1188) (0.1222) (0.1208) (0.1767)
Year2016 2.4936*** 2.0612*** 2.6006*** 3.4993***
(0.3411) (0.3946) (0.3591) (0.5330)
Distance30 -2.9344*** -1.0140* -5.0043*** -4.9719***
(0.4774) (0.5276) (0.5046) (0.6520)
Distance42.2 -10.8245*** -4.3382*** -16.9279*** -16.1563***
(0.8656) (1.0657) (0.8699) (1.3428)
SJ -0.9099*** -0.7976** -1.1865*** -1.9103***
(0.2975) (0.3404) (0.3181) (0.5089)
R2 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.12
Number of obs. 4868 4868 4868 4868
1 *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for a two-sided
test.
5 Discussion
How long will it take? This is a question familiar to most people from
daily life and the workplace. In this paper we explore whether long-distance
runners give an unbiased answers to a question about how they will per-
form in an upcoming race. Participating in a long-distance race usually
means months of extensive training and therefore also of important expe-
rience and performance feedback. Hence, we have a unique set of data on
experienced participants collected in the participants natural occurring en-
vironment. The data is used to address the important question of whether
overconfidence disappear with sufficient experience. The strength of our
data is that we observe people with extraordinary access to immediate, pre-
cise, and objective feedback. Furthermore, instead of relying on only one
race we use data from ten different samples. Making use of several studies
instead of one allows us to test the robustness of our findings.
Based on evidence from ten field studies we find that long-distance run-
ners often give biased predictions. That is, although their predictions are
relatively accurate they tend to be overly optimistic about their race time.
Moreover, the bias is found to be greater for males than for females. Hence,
the results show that if two individuals with different genders but equal
performance capacity are asked how long it will take them to finish a task
males will typically report a faster finishing time. This is not an expression
of their productivity but rather of their bias. Based on earlier findings in
the literature this could be a result of males being more goal-oriented and
motivated by competition (Deaner et al., 2015). These traits in turn make
them suppress past experience of how fast they actually are if it conflicts
with their desired race time. Moreover, these characteristics to overestimate
their capacity could be typical for not only male runners but for males in
general.
To be aware of the limitations of one’s capacity could be beneficial in
many situations, like in the prediction task in this study. In other situa-
tions, e.g., the labour market, overconfidence could even offer some benefits
(Palomino and Peyrache, 2010). Overconfidence is an personality trait, and
traits are known to be sufficiently stable across situations (Borghans et al.,
2008). Hence, it is tempting to generalize the behaviour found in this study
that males overestimate their capacity to carry over to other situations as
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well e.g. the labour market. One could actually even expect overconfidence
to be stronger in many other contexts since the immediate, precise, and
objective feedback that is available to long-distance running is rare in other
situations. But there are reasons to be cautious when generalizing the find-
ings of one study to other contexts and populations. Ideally, it would be
fruitful to test for time optimism in other contexts such as the labour market
before taking any major conclusions. This is, however, a non-trivial task,
and it requires access to a data base that could match both psychological
parameters of individuals and their salary (Palomino and Peyrache, 2010).
An interesting feature of the labor market is that an employer can only
gain a true understanding of the employees’ output and productivity of
employees with a time delay, if at all. This can make the employer to turn
to self-appraisals. Since self-appraisals could be biased and favourable for
males that overestimate their capacity compared to females it would be
better for females, however, if less attention were be paid to self-appraisals
in the recruitment of labor and setting wages.23
The most important lesson learned from this study is that even in sit-
uations where people are experienced gender differences in time optimism
can be expected. If we want to judge how productive people are, it is better
to let them ”walk the walk” than to ”talk the talk”. People do not act in
agreement with what they say and therefore we should judge them by their
behavior. Judging them by their talk will favour males over females.
23Interestingly, Leibbrandt and List (2014) show that simple statements of whether the
wage is negotiable or not in a job announcement can make a huge difference. They find
that when there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, men are more likely to
negotiate for a higher wage, whereas women are more likely to signal their willingness to
work for a lower wage. Explicitly mentioning the possibility of negotiating wages, however,
eliminates the gender differences in the share of candidates that negotiate for higher wage
and share of candidates that are willing to work for lower wage.
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6 Appendix 1
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Field Study 1
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 122.25 119.38 60.73 298.83 20.85 46287
Race time:Male 117.72 114.98 60.73 271.07 20.00 30197
Race time:Female 130.76 128.15 68.22 298.83 19.75 16090
Sample
Race time 115.79 113.60 60.73 235.27 20.72 1463
Race time:Male 110.03 107.75 60.73 207.03 18.82 963
Race time:Female 126.89 124.46 84.53 235.27 19.68 500
Guessed time 114.81 112.8 69.92 250.00 19.89 1463
Guessed time:Male 108.78 107.6 74.17 230.00 17.28 963
Guessed time:Female 126.43 122.54 69.92 250.00 19.43 500
Bias:Male 0.55 1.25 -76.50 43.35 8.41 963
Bias:Female 0.13 0.46 -110.47 122.17 11.33 500
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Table A2: Field Study 2
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 122.25 119.38 60.73 298.83 20.85 46287
Race time:Male 117.72 114.98 60.73 271.07 20.00 30197
Race time:Female 130.76 128.15 68.22 298.83 19.75 16090
Sample
Race time 118.04 115.52 71.77 206.72 20.04 330
Race time:Male 114.17 111.83 71.77 206.72 20.04 244
Race time:Female 129.01 127.74 87.28 191.57 19.99 86
Guessed time 119.95 115.77 72.00 232 21.28 330
Guessed time:Male 114.28 110.17 72.00 232 20.89 244
Guessed time:Female 128.34 127.47 88.98 185.45 18.91 86
Bias:Male -0.12 0.11 -66.60 26.53 8.69 244
Bias:Female 0.67 0.42 -17.47 22.44 6.62 86
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Table A3: Field Study 3
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 122.41 119.67 60.73 309.20 20.99 44955
Race time:Male 117.67 115.27 60.73 309.20 20.05 29310
Race time:Female 131.28 128.70 68.22 254.20 19.78 15645
Sample
Race time 120.39 117.60 73.22 233.85 24.44 531
Race time:Male 111.48 113.66 73.22 218.25 21.58 334
Race time:Female 131.80 127.02 76.45 233.85 24.81 197
Guessed time 117.89 116.20 68.15 236.20 22.52 531
Guessed time:Male 111.30 109.78 69.98 184.25 19.43 334
Guessed time:Female 129.05 125.25 68.15 236.20 23.04 197
Bias:Male 2.36 1.29 -87.42 43.25 9.58 334
Bias:Female 2.74 0.68 -27.42 67.28 10.39 197
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Table A4: Field Study 4
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 115.05 116.28 70.68 189.12 17.23 12232
Race time:Male 111.39 109.52 70.68 189.12 16.35 7641
Race time:Female 124.41 123.18 77.33 181.02 15.51 4591
Sample
Race time 117.19 116.07 74.1 174.4 18.80 71
Race time:Male 108.03 107.17 74.1 157.35 16.99 31
Race time:Female 124.30 122.74 99.48 174.4 17.15 40
Guessed time 118.51 116.45 74.28 260.48 18.21 71
Guessed time:Male 112.23 106.73 74.28 260.48 31.61 31
Guessed time:Female 123.39 122.11 76.88 164.6 16.93 40
Bias:Male -4.21 0.38 -171.38 9.47 31.30 31
Bias:Female 0.91 -1.18 -14.28 56.83 10.58 40
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Table A5: Field Study 5
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 122.82 121.91 64.85 194.05 18.69 171
Race time:Male 118.11 116.83 64.85 191.93 18.13 93
Race time:Female 130.30 129.33 76.05 194.05 17.04 78
Sample
Race time 125.22 123.25 74.27 184.02 22.09 10622
Race time:Male 118.38 116.62 74.27 171.62 19.57 6512
Race time:Female 133.37 130.56 84.15 184.02 22.27 4110
Guessed time 118.43 117.08 60.00 171.85 19.52 171
Guessed time:Male 111.99 110.00 76.00 169.35 17.43 93
Guessed time:Female 126.11 124.00 60.00 171.85 19.18 78
Bias:Male 6.40 5.38 -24.10 26.98 8.53 93
Bias:Female 7.26 5.26 -10.80 42.85 9.93 78
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Table B1: Field Study 6
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 187.04 182.12 97.60 396.42 33.90 17482
Race time:Male 181.97 177.10 97.60 368.52 33.04 12768
Race time:Female 200.75 196.63 118.23 396.42 32.38 4714
Sample
Race time 169.58 163.30 109.62 290.60 32.61 180
Race time:Male 162.78 158.12 109.62 290.60 28.16 144
Race time:Female 196.04 186.24 141.63 277.93 36.07 36
Guessed time 163.30 157.49 109.82 296.30 29.84 180
Guessed time:Male 155.73 152.50 109.82 257.12 22.09 144
Guessed time:Female 192.95 179.31 135.87 296.30 37.81 36
Bias:Male 7.09 4.48 -8.77 104.55 12.73 144
Bias:Female 3.08 1.93 -19.95 49.92 12.45 36
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Table B2: Field Study 7
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 187.04 182.12 97.60 396.42 33.90 17482
Race time:Male 181.97 177.10 97.60 368.52 33.04 12768
Race time:Female 200.75 196.63 118.23 396.42 32.38 4714
Sample
Race time 183.54 179.62 104.88 336.47 33.38 1036
Race time:Male 177.34 174.95 104.88 336.47 31.11 756
Race time:Female 200.28 198.35 118.23 318.58 33.61 280
Guessed time 179.06 175.73 91.78 315.00 33.27 1036
Guessed time:Male 171.18 169.98 91.78 315.00 28.77 756
Guessed time:Female 200.32 195.16 102.22 305.38 35.28 280
Bias:Male 6.15 4.21 -66.70 66.33 14.22 756
Bias:Female -0.05 0.45 -71.35 56.72 16.22 280
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Table B3: Field Study 8
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 189.73 184.98 97.85 396.42 35.73 15432
Race time:Male 184.50 179.04 97.85 368.52 34.89 11174
Race time:Female 203.46 198.78 116.88 396.42 34.24 4257
Sample
Race time 182.25 177.22 105.05 362.58 36.47 308
Race time:Male 176.99 169.35 105.05 362.58 36.83 209
Race time:Female 193.37 189.13 133.08 351.52 33.24 99
Guessed time 176.77 172.48 81.58 315.00 34.07 308
Guessed time:Male 170.18 165.02 81.58 315.00 33.58 209
Guessed time:Female 190.65 189.13 133.47 308.13 30.92 99
Bias:Male 6.80 3.57 -64.77 82.93 16.43 209
Bias:Female 2.71 2.73 -41.57 56.95 15.15 99
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Table C1: Field Study 9
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 246.25 241.5 138.37 376.53 38.77 17482
Race time:Male 240.47 236.49 138.37 376.53 37.99 12768
Race time:Female 262.29 260.48 154.23 368.76 36.31 4714
Sample
Race time 338.88 236.28 141.15 352.95 38.15 474
Race time:Male 232.43 227.93 141.15 352.95 36.64 342
Race time:Female 255.58 251.70 176.63 352.37 37.02 132
Guessed time 238.31 233.94 137.68 414.98 39.60 474
Guessed time:Male 231.49 225.53 137.68 414.98 38.21 342
Guessed time:Female 255.96 252.20 177.33 350.00 37.76 132
Bias:Male 0.94 0.53 -204.02 61.58 21.20 342
Bias:Female -0.37 -0.67 -35.63 51.00 13.37 132
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Table C2: Field Study 10
Population Mean Median Min Max St.Dev #obs
Race time 250.72 247.24 130.97 377.15 39.91 12854
Race time:Male 245.28 239.65 130.97 377.15 39.61 9460
Race time:Female 265.87 263.83 151.77 375.45 36.74 3394
Sample
Race time 245.61 239.11 165.97 351.42 38.60 304
Race time:Male 238.02 233.38 165.97 332.50 34.68 210
Race time:Female 262.55 265.96 172.07 351.42 41.61 94
Guessed time 239.74 236.03 159.98 358.00 37.93 304
Guessed time:Male 231.51 228.00 159.98 358.00 33.82 210
Guessed time:Female 258.13 261.33 173.17 347.53 40.27 94
Bias:Male 6.52 4.98 79.58 66.02 16.82 210
Bias:Female 4.42 1.52 -61.97 72.60 21.72 94
41
6.2 Time bias
Table D1: Time Bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
1 2.86 [2.18; 3.55] 0.96 [0.44; 1.48]
2 1.70 [0.34; 3.06] 1.01 [-0.11; 2.12]
3 4.04 [2.43; 5.64] 1.67 [0.60; 2.74]
4 2.51 [0.07; 4.96] -0.63 [-2.77; 1.51]
5 10.19 [8.47; 11.90] 6.04 [4.14; 7.93]
Table D2: Time bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
6 8.29 [2.92; 13.67] 3.91 [-1.77; 9.60]
7 8.85 [7.41; 10.28] 1.35 [-0.06; 2.76]
8 10.27 [6.78; 13.76] 6.08 [3.21; 8.95]
Table D3: Time bias [95% confidence intervals]
Field Study Male Female
9 3.47 [1.54; 5.40] 0.74 [-1.49; 2.97]
10 8.27 [4.60; 11.94] 3.29 [-0.66; 7.23]
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